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Abstract Due to the convenience of access-on-demand to information and
business solutions, mobile apps have become an important asset in the digital
world. In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, app developers have joined the
response effort in various ways by releasing apps that target different user bases
(e.g., all citizens or journalists), offer different services (e.g., location tracking
or diagnostic-aid), provide generic or specialized information, etc. While many
apps have raised some concerns by spreading misinformation or even malware,
the literature does not yet provide a clear landscape of the different apps
that were developed. In this study, we focus on the Android ecosystem and
investigate Covid-related Android apps. In a best-effort scenario, we attempt
to systematically identify all relevant apps and study their characteristics with
the objective to provide a first taxonomy of Covid-related apps, broadening
the relevance beyond the implementation of contact tracing. Overall, our study
yields a number of empirical insights that contribute to enlarge the knowledge
on Covid-related apps: (1) Developer communities contributed rapidly to the
Covid-19, with apps released as early as February 2020; (2) Covid-related
apps deliver digital tools to users (e.g., health diaries), serve to broadcast
information to users (e.g., spread statistics), and collect data from users (e.g.,
for tracing); (3) Covid-related apps are less complex than standard apps; (4)
they generally do not seem to leak sensitive data; (5) in the majority of cases,
Covid-related apps are released by entities with past experience on the market,
mostly official government entities or public health organizations.
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1 Introduction
The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in late December 2019 has quickly
and severely impacted countries worldwide, becoming one of the most impor-
tant health crisis of the 21st century (Spinelli and Pellino 2020; Remuzzi and
Remuzzi 2020). The infectious agent, a coronavirus, identified as responsible
for this disease is notoriously difficult to pin down: while it leaves many in-
fected people without symptoms, it can lead to a common cold for some and
even severe respiratory disorders to others (Clerkin et al. 2020). So far, the
Covid-19 has brought about a human tragedy, with hundreds of thousands of
lives lost, as well as an economic downturn due to the lockdown of over three
billion people (half of humanity) (Mahase 2020; Dudel et al. 2020).
The scale of Covid-19 effects has urged stakeholders at different levels (gov-
ernment, local authorities, private companies, academia, NGOs, and citizens)
to plan and implement measures for addressing the virus spread. In particular,
while pharmaceutical research is embarked on a long journey to develop a vac-
cine, non-pharmaceutical innovations are sought to contribute to responding
to the outbreak. Chief among the technologies that are employed, Information
and Communication Technology has been widely leveraged in various capaci-
ties across all regions and targeting broadly all levels of society. For example,
news and sensitization messages have been viral thanks to the use of internet-
based services such as social networks. Given the widespread use of handheld
devices such as smartphones, users are keen to install applications (often re-
ferred to as apps in the mobile realm) that have specific purposes for enter-
tainment, business, productivity, news, and social networking. Following the
outbreak of the pandemic, authorities, non-governmental organizations, and
independent developers have engaged in an app development race to provide
readily-available digital tools to the modern citizen.
We focus in this paper on the case of the Android ecosystem. With the
largest market share on mobiles (86% in 2020 (IDC 2020)), Android con-
stitutes a prime choice for developers and users alike. Initial reporting on
Covid-19 related apps are focused on the problems that such apps raise: (1)
He et al. (2020) have already explored the case of coronavirus-themed An-
droid malware; (2) Google, the maintainer of the Play Store (i.e., the official
Android app market) has decided to crack down on Covid-19 apps to combat
misinformation, sometimes with an excessive zeal (i.e., legitimate apps can
be temporarily banned just for sharing Covid-19 information (Carman 2020;
Google 2020)).
Our study is of a broader and more generic dimension. It is about charac-
terizing the applications that are related to the Covid-19 outbreak:
What are they for? Who developed them? To what extent can they be con-
sidered dangerous? These are some of the questions that we undertake to
investigate. To that end, we have considered 184 563 apps released in the time
window of July 2019-May 2020 and collected in the AndroZoo dataset (Allix
et al. 2016). From this initial set of Android apps, by following well-defined
heuristics, we were able to identify 44 Covid-related apps. Given the limita-
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tions of the crawling of AndroZoo, we also considered other online resources
such as the GitHub search engine, specialized Covid-19 technology blogs, etc.,
and we finally raise the number of collected Covid-related apps to 92. We
extract different features from these apps and provide summary statistics on
their characterization.
This paper presents our analyses exploring the use of permissions and li-
braries, the presence of leaks, the malicious status, the code size and com-
plexity, the authorship, and the described purposes. Mainly, we establish that
most of the apps are made for informing people, monitoring their health, and
tracing users with the goal of preventing the spread of the virus. In addition,
we note that Covid-related apps are not flagged by malware detectors. Yet,
we found that some of them have been removed from Google Play. Then, af-
ter assessing the complexity of Covid-related apps and comparing them with
standard apps, we found that on average, Covid-related apps are less complex,
which has been shown to often be indicative of quality for apps (Josˇt et al.
2013). Finally, we applied state-of-the-art security and privacy scanners in or-
der to check for potential cryptographic API misuses and data leaks in the
code.
In summary, we present the following contributions:
– We present the first systematic study of Covid-related apps that explores
their characteristics and compare them with other non-Covid-related apps.
– We build a taxonomy of Covid-related apps based on their described goals.
– We apply literature analysis tools on Covid-related apps and discuss their
results.
All artifacts are made available online at:
https://github.com/JordanSamhi/APKCOVID
1.1 Research questions
The main objective of this work is to analyze and understand Covid-related
apps. To do so, we empirically observe apps characteristics by extracting fea-
tures that provide insights toward understanding those apps. Hence, to ac-
complish this objective, we plan to answer the following research questions:
– RQ 1: What are Covid-related apps used for?
– RQ 2: When did Covid-related apps start to appear in Google Play?
– RQ 3: Do Covid-related apps have specific characteristics?
– RQ 4: Are Covid-related Android apps more complex than standard apps?
– RQ 5: To what extent were Covid-related apps removed from the official
Google Play and why?
– RQ 6: Who are Covid-related apps’ developers?
– RQ 7: Are Covid-related apps flagged by privacy & security scanners?
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, we present an
initial Android apps dataset and some background for the reader in Section 2.
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Then, in Section 3, we give details about the experimental setup of our study.
In Section 4, we provide the results obtained from our experiments. We discuss
the threats to validity of our study in Section 5. Finally, we discuss related
work in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
2 Dataset and Background on App Analysis
Initial Dataset: In order to perform our experiments and to exhaustively
answer the research questions presented in Introduction, we need to rely on
a comprehensive dataset. Consequently, we used the state-of-the-art largest
dataset available, namely AndroZoo (Allix et al. 2016). At the time of writ-
ing, AndroZoo contains more than 11 million Android apps (June 2020) that
have been collected from different sources, such as Google Play and other
third-party providers (F-Droid, Anzhi, AppChina, etc.). As it is continuously
growing, researchers still heavily rely on AndroZoo for collecting apps and
experimenting on it (Ranganath and Mitra 2020; Shar et al. 2020; He et al.
2020; Xu et al. 2020).
Since the Covid-19 outbreak is quite recent, we did not consider the 11
million Android apps present in AndroZoo. For our study, we instead consid-
ered and collected from AndroZoo all the apps ranging from July, 1st 2019 to
May, 25th 2020, leading to a total number of 184 432 collected apps. Note that
AndroZoo does not contain information about the release date of an app, i.e.,
there is no information about when an app has been uploaded on the market.
For this reason, we approximate the date of an app by considering the date
of the dex files in apks. Figure 1 shows the distribution of collected APKs
according to the month of the date of the dex files in APKs.
Dataset Augmentation: It is a known problem that the date metadata in
APKs (approximated as the date of the dex files) is not always reliable (Li
et al. 2018). For this reason, we decided to augment our dataset (1) by not
considering the time window from July 2019 to May 2020 and (2) by selecting
any apps from AndroZoo whose package name contained the words covid-19,
covid19 or coronavirus. With this heuristic, we were able to retrieve 131 apps
from AndroZoo.
⇒ Finally, our initial dataset is constituted of 184 563 Android apps.
Short Background on Android Apps: In general, Java is the language used
by developers to create Android applications, though other languages can be
used such as Kotlin, or even languages such as C and C++ thanks to the Native
Development Kit (NDK). For common Java applications, the source code is
compiled into Java bytecode and run into the Java virtual machine. However,
within the Android operating system lies the Dalvik Virtual Machine which
is an optimized version of the Java Virtual Machine. Thus, regarding mobile
apps, the source code is first compiled into Java bytecode, then translated into
Dalvik bytecode and written in DEX files.
Still, the DEX files do not constitute an application. Indeed, an Android
app is a collection of files packaged together in the so-called Android Applica-
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Fig. 1: Monthly distribution of Android apps considered in this study
tion Package (APK). This format is used for distributing apps on devices, not
only via official and unofficial markets but also via any other channels where
an independent file can be distributed. Indeed, Android devices allow users to
install applications from any sources once a configuration option is toggled off.
An APK is typically a zip file containing the following files: (1) Meta-
data files, (2) the certificate(s) used to sign the application, (3) a lib folder
containing platform-dependent compiled code, (4) compiled and non-compiled
resource files, (5) one or multiple DEX files, generally named classesX.dex
with X an integer, (6) an AndroidManifest.xml file describing the application
(package name, components, version, access rights, etc.).
3 Experiment Setup
In this section, we describe the setup of our experiments. More specifically,
in Section 3.1 we describe how we create a dataset of Covid-related apps by
searching apps in both our initial dataset extracted from AndroZoo, and on
the web. Then we describe in Section 3.2 how the information needed for
answering the research questions was extracted.
3.1 Dataset curation
The large majority of apps contained in our initial dataset of Android apps
are not related to the Covid-19 outbreak. Consequently, we need to curate
this dataset. Our first idea was to rely on a clear definition of what is a
Covid-related app. However, we realized that finding a correct and precise
definition is not obvious. For instance, the english Wikipedia page related to
Covid-19 (Wikipedia 2020) defines Covid-related apps as ”mobile software ap-
plications that use digital tracking to aid contact tracing in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic, i.e. the process of identifying persons (”contacts”) who
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may have been in contact with an infected individual.”(accessed early June
2020). We quickly considered this definition as too restrictive since we found
several Covid-related apps that are not about ”digital tracing”. As a result,
rather than relying on a definition of what is a Covid-related app we (1) im-
plemented several heuristics based on hypotheses, and (2) performed several
quality checks to filter out irrelevant apps.
Hypothesis 1: Our first hypothesis is that a Covid-related app contains
strings (e.g., in a class name or method name) related to Covid-19. Based
on this hypothesis, we defined several regular expressions that we apply on
various fields on an Android app. More specifically, we proceed as follows:
Let A be a set of Android apps and apk an app of this set. Let be:
• Capk the set of classes names in apk,
• Mapk the set of method names in apk,
• Fapk the set of file names in apk,
• Sapk the set of strings contained apk,
We keep apk if at least one element of Capk ∪Mapk ∪ Fapk ∪ Sapk matches at
least one regular expressions listed in Table 1. An app is kept if for instance, a
class name contains the substring coronavirus, or if the app contains a string
with pandemi as substring.
”(?i).*coronavirus” ”(?i).*corona”
”(?i).*sars(-?cov)” ”(?i).*quarantin.*”
”(?i).*lock-?down” ”(?i).*containment”
”(?i).*social-?distanc.*” ”(?i).*pandemi.*”
”(?i).*out-?break” ”(?i).*epidemi.*”
”(?i).*confinement”
Table 1: Regular expressions used to filter out non Covid-related apps
We ended up with a set of 35 613 supposedly Covid-related apps. In Fig-
ure 2, we can see the number of apps that were retrieved per keyword (note
that several keywords can be present in a given app).
Quality Check #1: We can see in Figure 2 that the keywords corona and
quarantine match a significantly larger number of apps. After investigation, we
found that the keyword quarantine is used in strings by developers to check
if the smartphones are rooted, i.e., if the user has super-user (root) privilege.
Indeed, the presence of some packages can characterize the fact that a smart-
phone is rooted. Among such packages, one is named com.ramdroid.app-
quarantine and another is named com.ramdroid.appquarantinepro. To ve-
rify the presence of these two packages, developers often use these package
names as string, and thus the regular expression using quarantine matches.
This explains why there is such a high number of apps containing quarantine
in strings. We manually analyzed several dozens of apps and confirmed they
are not real Covid-related apps (mainly music, education, news, shopping, and
game apps).
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Fig. 2: Heatmap representing the number of apps gathered by each
Covid-related keyword, and for each family of features
Regarding the corona keyword, it also appears in a substantial number of
apps, especially in string feature. After manual investigation, we found that
apps retrieved with this keyword use a framework called Corona developed by
Coronalabs1. These apps are mainly games, entertainment and personalization
apps. Moreover, the word corona not only refers to Covid-19, but also has uses
in several unrelated contexts (in architecture, beverages, books, music, movies,
and games).
We decided to rule out both keywords corona and quarantine, as they
revealed to mostly bring noise in our dataset. After filtering the apps gathered,
i.e., not taking into account the corona and quarantine keywords, we obtained
4103 apps.
Hypothesis 2: Our second hypothesis is that since AndroZoo is known
to contain successive versions of the same apps (Allix et al. 2016; Li et al.
2018), our dataset contains successive versions of the same Covid-related app.
Therefore, for the subsequent analyses, we only keep the latest version of a
given app. This step is performed by comparing apps version code—available
in AndroZoo metadata—and keeping the highest value. After this step, our
dataset contains 750 apps.
Hypothesis 3: Our third hypothesis is that official Covid-related apps
are released only on the official Android market, i.e., the Google Play market.
Figure 3 depicts the distributions of the apps per market from where they
have been crawled. Most of the apps were released in the official Google Play
market. By considering apps from Google Play only, we reach the number of
619 apps.
Quality Check #2: To check the quality of our dataset, we inspect the
date of the dex file in the APKs. The Covid-19 outbreak was not known until
the very end of 2019, so we expect to find apps from 2020 only. Figure 4
presents the distribution of those apps by the date of the dex file in the APK.
1 https://coronalabs.com/
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Fig. 3: Distribution of the 750 supposedly Covid-related apps by markets
where they were obtained from
First, we observe that fewer apps were released during winter 2019-2020. Then
we can see that starting from March 2020, a significant amount of apps were
developed, which corresponds to the containment period.
Finally, Figure 4 show that our set of Covid-related apps contains a sig-
nificant amount of apps developed before the pandemic, which indicates the
low quality of our dataset and that an additional layer of filtering is needed
to only keep Covid-related apps. Indeed, our manual investigations of those
apps revealed that they contained keywords that may be overly broad. For
example, it appeared that keywords such as outbreak, pandemic, containment
or lockdown were popular in games, most notably in the zombies and survival
games genres.
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Fig. 4: Timeline representing the number of apps with Covid-related
keywords in function of time
Hypothesis 4: Our fourth hypothesis is that the description of an app is a
reliable source of information to check that an app is Covid-related. AndroZoo
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does not provide the app descriptions, so we queried Google Play to retrieve
the description of the 619 apps. Note that it was possible to get the description
for 537 apps, while 82 apps were not available anymore in Google Play at that
time. Actually, AndroZoo uses a crawler to automatically download apps. It
is possible that AndroZoo downloads an app at a time t1, but if Google Play
decides to remove this app (or if the developer decides to remove it) at time
t2, with t1 < t2, it is not possible to access the description of the app anymore
after time t2. We found that Google is actively deleting apps that are violating
their policy with respect to Covid-19 (Carman 2020; Google 2020).
Manual investigations of the remaining 537 apps were conducted to qualify
an app as Covid-related. We did so by analyzing the Google Play page of every
app, reading the description, and looking at screenshots. We did not encounter
any ambiguous case, hence it was straightforward to qualify an app as Covid-
related or not. With this method, we determined with high certainty that 44
apps taken from AndroZoo were Covid-related.
Note that the set of apps from our initial dataset for which the package
name contained Covid-related keywords contained 131 elements and we only
retrieved 44 apps. This is explained by the fact that among those 131 apps,
there were, for almost one-fifth, different versions of the same app. In addition,
we were not able to analyze the Google Play page of apps that were not
available in the Google Play market.
Figure 5 gives two examples to show an app we discarded and an app that
was considered as Covid-related. First, the game picture on the left clearly
shows a game in which the user has to kill zombies, even though the game
contains the string outbreak. Second, the Covid-related app on the right is ex-
plicit regarding the content delivered to the user. The title refers to Covid-19,
the description gives clues about the content, i.e., information about Covid-
19 and guidelines about Covid-19. Besides, the screenshots are also explicit
by depicting what actions users can perform, here Covid-related actions, i.e.,
getting information about Covid-19, performing self-diagnosis, receiving guide-
lines, and news about Covid-19. It represents how unequivocally our decisions
were to be made to qualify an app as Covid-related or not.
Hypothesis 5: As AndroZoo is not exhaustive and all the apps in the
Google Play market are not available for download from every country (An-
droZoo crawls from specific countries), we felt the need to expand our research.
Consequently, manual investigations were conducted on the web to search for
apps that would not be available in Google Play and/or that our empirical
analysis on AndroZoo did not catch. We found 48 additional apps from di-
verse countries from different time span, e.g. we found apps that were first
seen in June 2020. Thus, our set of COVID-applications reached a length of
92 apps.
⇒ Figure 6 summarizes our dataset curation process.
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Fig. 5: Comparison between two Google Play page of two different apps. Left
app: Zombie game; right app: Covid-related app.
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750
6194448
AndroZoo Keywords
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Only
Google
Play apps
Manual
Analysis
External
apps
92 Covid-
related
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Fig. 6: Process of our dataset curation. Numbers represent numbers of apps.
Dotted boxes represent filters used to refine the dataset.
3.2 Features extraction
In this section, we expose what features were extracted from the apps con-
sidered in this study and how we extracted it. Three ways of retrieving the
needed information were considered: (1) Extracted from AndroZoo, (2) Au-
tomated analysis of the apps, and (3) Manual analysis, which we describe
below.
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3.2.1 AndroZoo metadata
Apps from AndroZoo are provided with additional metadata, i.e., a vector
of length 11 representing different information. Those metadata elements are
used to expose several properties of the apps under analysis. We consider the
date of the dex files to verify when the Covid-related apps started to appear.
The package names and version codes were useful to have some insights into
the versioning of the apps and to keep only the latest version of the app
considered, i.e., one version of the app will be analyzed. When available, the
number of AntiVirus products reporting an app as malicious (obtained from
VirusTotal) was used for qualifying the maliciousness of the apps. Finally,
AndroZoo metadata also indicate the source where an app was obtained from.
3.2.2 Automated analyses of apps
AndroZoo metadata being limited, we additionally leveraged existing tools
and frameworks to analyze Android apps in order to obtain the information
to acquire the information needed by our study.
– We developed a program relying on the Androguard software package 2.
Thanks to this tool, we extract the permissions requested by the apps,
as well as information about components in the applications (i.e., Activi-
ties, Services, etc.). We also automatically compute the complexity metrics
described in Appendix A.
– We used CogniCrypt (Krger et al. 2017) and its headless implementation
CryptoAnalysis (CryptoAnalysis 2020) to check that they were written
following best practices regarding cryptographic APIs.
– As several Covid-related apps seek to acquire and process the location of
users (considered a piece of sensitive information), we verify if those apps
were subject to data leaks. Hence, we leverage FlowDroid-IccTA (Li et al.
2015), the state-of-the-art static data leak detector dedicated to Android
apps.
3.2.3 Manual analyses of apps
While application information that can be readily obtained through automatic
tools were necessary for our study, we went a step further and acquired quali-
tative data on the apps.
By collecting and carefully reading the descriptions of apps3 and by con-
firming the validity of our understanding by matching the reviews and app
screenshots with the description, we were able to assemble highly-qualified
2 https://github.com/androguard/androguard
3 The description of an app can be retrieved from the web page of the
app on Google Play. This web page can be accessed with the following link:
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=PACKAGENAME, where PACKAGE-
NAME is the package name of the app (e.g. fr.gouv.android.stopcovid).
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data on the goals of app developers, on whether an app is developed by a
state body or an individual person, etc.
Finally, after leveraging the automated tools described above, their results
were manually confirmed for the set of Covid-related apps (i.e., 92). This
allowed us to ensure those tools did not yield false-positives, and that their
results were sound and consistent.
4 Results
In this section, we present our experimental results and we answer our research
questions.
4.1 What are Covid-related apps used for?
Textual descriptions of apps on markets generally provide a wealth of infor-
mation on the purpose and functionalities that developers advertise. We un-
dertake to systematically examine the descriptions of all the apps under study.
Unfortunately, since Google Play is actively moderating Covid-related apps,
we have faced an issue with some apps that we were able to initially collect but
which were no longer available on the market at the time of analysis. Even-
tually, our analysis of descriptions was performed on 78 apps. In other words,
from the time we read the descriptions of the apps to curate our dataset (as
explained in Section 3.1) and the time we perform this more in-depth study,
i.e., collecting information related to the features of the apps, 14 apps (92−78)
were not able anymore on GooglePlay.
A Taxonomy of Covid-related apps. After a careful analysis of informa-
tion available in Google Play, we summarize for each app its general goal, i.e.,
which aspects of the Covid-19 crisis the app is precisely intended to address.
Eventually, we identified three main categories to which each app can be asso-
ciated with possible overlap between categories, i.e., an app can be associated
with several categories:
1. Information broadcast (top-down) - Apps in this category aim to provide
users with various types of information, from general guidelines, infection
statistics to general Covid-19 news. Although such apps are not always of-
ficially released by government bodies, they often relay official information
from top (authorities) down (users).
2. Upstream collection (bottom-up) - Apps in this category collect information
from users and make it available to the developer and/or an official body,
such as a country’s health authorities.
3. Tooling - Apps in this category serve as tools with functionalities that
directly deal with daily aspects of the Covid-19 (e.g., generation of certifi-
cates).
[1] Information broadcast. From the collected dataset of Covid-related apps
we identified several distinguishing scenarios in apps performing information
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broadcasting. Figure 7 overviews the related characteristics, notably based on
the types of information that are made available to the user:
Information
Broadcast
Guidelines
Infection
Statistics
General
Zones
to avoid
Behavioral Filtered
Not
filtered
Map Textual Written Video Vocal
22
23 32 1 4
15 14
Fig. 7: Information Broadcast category. The number below a leaf box indicates
the number of related apps.
1. Guidelines on measures to take to minimize the risk of infection - Among
such apps, some render maps highlighting high-risk areas. Other apps pro-
vide behavioral advice (e.g., how to wash hands), leveraging the whole
spectrum of available media: (1) textual descriptions (for the majority of
apps), (2) videos and, (3) audio clips.
2. Continuously-updated Statistics on the pandemic evolution;
3. General information about Covid-19, such as about the typical symptoms.
We identified two different scenarios in the provision of general information:
– Some apps present curated information, i.e., information that is some-
how checked and filtered by the development team before it is shown
to the public. Such information is often tagged in a way that allows
interested people to find the source, and gauge its credibility. Some-
times, these apps are developed directly by an entity that itself carries
credibility as a source of information, such as national healthcare au-
thorities. An example is the MyHealth Sri Lanka app4 developed by the
national ICT Agency, which presents to the user verified information
on the current Covid-19 status.
– A number of apps appear to provide unfiltered information regard-
ing Covid-19. Their developers are not always themselves entities that
would traditionally be assumed to have any specific credibility on the
matter. For example, the DiagnoseMe app5, which claims to provide the
user with all the information on the virus, is proposed by an association
with unrecorded expertise in health.
[2] Upstream collection. Most apps in our dataset perform data collection
from users. This suggests that many app providers consider data to be key in
4 package name: app.ceylon.selftrackingapp
5 package name: bf.diagnoseme.fasocivic
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the mitigation of the Covid-19 crisis. App providers indeed collect a variety
of information, including user personal information (e.g., name, age, address,
etc.), some medical information (e.g., whether a user is infected with Covid-19,
the therapies that are used). Some apps are even used to keep a health diary
(sharing information about symptoms every day), or to report the infection of
people in the app user’s acquaintances.
Overall, we have identified three different ways in which apps collect user
data, as summarized in Figure 8. Note that in the case of data collection and
spread tracking apps, we did not try to qualify whether apps were as privacy-
preserving as their developers claimed they were (e.g., data is deleted after N
days), nor to determine to what extent the collected data is shared with third
parties.
Similarly, for this paper, we did not analyze the inner workings of contact-
tracing apps, and we did not evaluate the merit nor the opportunity of contact-
tracing, this having already been—and still being to this date—discussed by
security researchers (Culnane 2020; Anderson 2020; Baumgrtner et al. 2020).
Upstream
Data
Collection
Spread
Tracking
Personal
Medical
Report
Report
Case
Geo-
Monitoring
Social-
Distancing
Contact
Tracing
Are you
infected?
Health
Diary
Current
Treatments
Automatic Manual GPS
Location
Diary Bluetooth
Diagnosis
QR code
Scanning User data
Automated Professional
Form
Virtual
Assistant
Live
Assistance
Phone
Instant
Messages Video
18 4 2
25 17 2 18
2
12 6 13
1
35 3
5 2 4
Fig. 8: Upstream category
Several apps take inputs from the users to offer diagnoses related to Covid-
19. Such apps can provide a built-in questionnaire that users have to fill within
the app, or leverage a virtual assistant or chatbot. In these cases, the diagnosis
can be made automatically, with no interaction nor confirmation with a trained
medical practitioner.
Other apps, however, provide a somewhat more traditional medical visit
experience, by offering the facilities needed to remotely exchange (e.g., via
instant text messages as well as voice and/or video calls) with a medical doc-
tor. Such apps are used from home, since millions of people worldwide were
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confined, and were potentially reluctant or unable to visit a brick-and-mortar
doctor’s office.
Additionally, some apps are developed to track the spread of the virus
by locating the users of the apps. While a few of those apps use simple geo-
monitoring with GPS information for tracking users, most apps do it auto-
matically. Nevertheless, we found a few apps that request users to provide
a-posteriori the locations they have visited on a given day. We also identified
one app which uses QR code scanning at the entrance of public buildings to
obtain precise location information, while still being fully under users’ control.
With respect to tracing, a few apps promote social-distancing using the
GPS location of users, the goal being to not approach other people too closely.
Furthermore, several apps implement contract-tracing, i.e., the ability to
retrieve who a specific person has been in contact with, providing users a way
to know if they have encountered someone infected, and potentially infectious.
Contact-tracing apps mainly rely on three methods, (1) Using the GPS loca-
tion of users, (2) Using the Bluetooth technology to detect proximity, and (3)
Using a location diary that the users have to manually fill.
[3] Tooling The last category is the tooling category which includes sev-
eral types of tools aimed at helping users deal with some consequences of the
Covid-19 crisis (see Figure 9). A few apps allow users to auto-generate docu-
ments for their local authorities (e.g., travel authorization that had been made
mandatory in several countries during containment).
Users can also install apps offering appointment-capabilities for medical
purposes, or selling Covid-related products (e.g., masks, hand-sanitizers, etc.).
On the entertainment front, apps were released proposing games around the
pandemic, or providing users with Covid-19-themed image filters, for example
adding a virtual mask, or adding virtual decorative elements to an actual mask.
Lastly, apps were also made to cater to the newly-discovered needs of mas-
sive remote education.
Tooling
Document
generation for
authorities
Appointments Sales Entertainment Education
4 1 2 1 1
Fig. 9: Tooling category
The interested reader can inspect Tables 2, 3 and 4 for more information
about the mapping between categories and the apps for which we were able
to retrieve the relevant information.
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RQ1 Answer: Our empirical analyses show that overall, Covid-related
apps are mainly developed for:
1. Providing users with information;
2. Collecting data from users;
3. Offering users Covid-related tools.
4.2 When did Covid-related apps start to appear in Google Play?
In this section, we consider the 92 collected Covid-related apks6. As the first
release date of apps is not available on Google Play, we need to rely on other
sources of information to try to find the first appearance date. Therefore, in
order to visualize when Covid-related apps appeared, we selected, for each
app (when available), the minimum date among the AndroZoo added date,
the VirusTotal first seen date and dates available in third party datasets (i.e.,
Koodous7, APKCombo8, APKPure9). The results can be seen in Figure 10.
We can see that those apps started to appear as early as February 2020,
i.e., before the pandemic was officially recognized by the World Health Orga-
nization (i.e., March, 11th 2020) (Ghebreyesus 2020).
We can also see in Figure 10 that since February 2020, the number of new
apps seen has only increased. We note that for June 2020, the lower number
is not significant: Our study, and app collection process, stops in early June
202010.
RQ 2 Answer: Covid-related apps started to emerge on markets as early
as February 2020, i.e., even before the World Health Organization officially
declared Covid-19 as a pandemic.
4.3 Do Covid-related apps have specific characteristics?
In prior work, Tian et al. (2015) have shown that specific sets of apps can
have similar characteristics (e.g., similar permissions, components, size, etc.).
In this section, we investigate to what extent 92 apps form one coherent group
that is significantly different than other apps.
To that end, for each app, we counted the number of different Android com-
ponents (i.e., Activities, Broadcast Receivers, Services, and Content
6 We remind that we collected 92 apks but only 78 descriptions. So, if descriptions are
required to perform a study, 78 apks are considered. If not, 92 apks are considered.
7 https://koodous.com
8 https://apkcombo.com
9 https://apkpure.com
10 We remind the reader that, while our initial app dataset built from AndroZoo contains
apps until end of May 2020, our dataset manually collected contains apps from June 2020
(See Section 3.1)
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Package name Country Developer type Target Information Broadcast
com.gov.mcmc.projectcatur Malaysia Governmental Citizen X X
com.mohw.corona South Korea Governmental Foreigners
kg.cdt.stopcovid19 Kyrgyztan Governmental Citizen
pl.nask.mobywatel Poland Governmental Citizen X X
app.ceylon.selftrackingapp Sri Lanka Governmental Citizen X
bf.diagnoseme.fasocivic Burkina Faso Association Citizen X X X X X X
com.moc.gh Ghana Governmental Citizen X
com.vost.covid19mobile Portugal Governmental Citizen X X
sg.gov.tech.bluetrace Singapore Governmental Citizen X
com.joinzoe.covid zoe UK/Sweden Company Citizen
am.gov.covid19 Armenia Governmental Citizen
sa.gov.nic.tawakkalna Saudi Arabia Governmental Citizen X
fr.gouv.android.stopcovid France Governmental Citizen X
is.landlaeknir.rakning Iceland Governmental Citizen
jo.gov.moh.aman Jordan Governmental Citizen X
nz.govt.health.covidtracer New Zealand Governmental Citizen
es.gob.asistenciacovid19 Spain Governmental Citizen X
com.moi.covid19 Qatar Governmental Citizen X
au.gov.health.covid19 Australia Governmental Citizen X X
at.roteskreuz.stopcorona Autriche NGO Citizen
com.proudcrowd.care USA Company Citizen
com.ri.crushcovid USA Governmental Citizen X
au.gov.health.covidsafe Australia Governmental Citizen X
ca.bc.gov.health.hlbc.COVID19 Canada Governmental Citizen X X
de.kreativzirkel.coronika Germany Company Citizen X
com.coronacheck.haugxhaug
.testyourcorona
Germany Researchers Citizen X X
cat.gencat.mobi.StopCovid19Cat Spain Governmental Citizen X
cat.gencat.mobi.confinApp Spain Governmental Citizen X
com.ambulis.aphm.covid France Company Patients X
fr.aphp.covidom France Hospital Patients
appinventor.ai david taylor
.Coronavirus help2020
Worldwide Independent Citizen X
uy.gub.salud.plancovid19uy Uruguay Governmental Citizen
com.covid19 algeria Algeria Governmental Citizen X
com.agetic.coronavirusapp Bolivia Governmental Citizen X X
ch.covid19bs.app.PMSMobile Switzerland Governmental Citizen X
es.gva.coronavirus Soain Governmental Citizen X
com.govpk.covid19 Pakistan Governmental Citizen
covid19care.virus.coronavirus
.corona.sick.marcom.health.pakistan
Pakistan Company
Media
Journalists
X X
com.tommasomauriello
.autocertificazionecoronavirus
Italia Independent Citizen
ca.gc.hcsc.canada.covid19 Canada Governmental Citizen X X X
com.krrsoftwaresolutions11.Facemasks Undefined Company Consumers X
it.adilife.covid19.app Italia Company Citizen
it.adl.aslroma3.covid19.app Italia Company Citizen
com.coronavirus.facemask Undefined Company Users
com.osapps.covid19 Undefined Company Citizen X X
com.maithu.transplantbuddy.covid19 Ireland Company Patients
ar.gob.coronavirus Argentina Governmental Citizen
com.bloomreality.sodi Undefined Company Citizen
br.gov.datasus.guardioes Brazil Governmental Citizen X X X
cz.covid19cz.erouska Czech Republic Governmental Citizen X
com.covid19.dgmup India Governmental Citizen X
com.docandu.checker Greece Company Citizen X
it.softmining.projects.covid19
.savelifestyle
Italia Company Citizen X
nic.goi.aarogyasetu India Governmental Citizen X
com.dawsoftware.contacttracker Undefined Company Citizen
com.hamagen Israel Governmental Citizen
hu.gov.virusradar Hungary Governmental Citizen
world.coalition.app Undefined Company Citizen
mk.gov.koronavirus.stop Macedonian Governmental Citizen
org.sshield.selfshield CommonWeath Association Citizen
org.pathcheck.covidsafepaths Undefined Association Citizen
com.knasirayaz.mohapcovid
United Arab
Emirates
Governmental Citizen X X
gov.georgia.novid20 Georgia Governmental Citizen
nl.lumc.covidradar Netherlands Governmental Citizen X X
com.Eha.covid 19 Vietnam Governmental Citizen X X X
covid.trace.morocco Morocco Governmental Citizen X
ru.mos.socmon Russia Governmental Patients X
org.prixa.p5covidtracker Nepal Governmental Citizen X
de.bssd.covid19 Germany Company Patients
com.edu.aku.akuhccheck Pakistan Researchers Citizen X X X
com.pixxonai.covid19 India Governmental
Quarantine
persons
de.rki.coronadatenspende Germany Governmental Citizen
mx.gob.www Mexico Governmental Citizen X X
tr.gov.saglik.koronaonlem Turkey Governmental Citizen X
com.telkom.tracencare Indonesia Governmental Citizen
co.gov.ins.guardianes Colombia Governmental Citizen X
bh.bahrain.corona.tracker Bahrain Governmental Citizen X
bg.government.virusafe Bulgaria Governmental Citizen X
Table 2: First part of Covid-related apps’ characteristics retrieved from Google
Play apps pages
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Package name Upstream
com.gov.mcmc.projectcatur X
com.mohw.corona X
kg.cdt.stopcovid19 X X X
pl.nask.mobywatel
app.ceylon.selftrackingapp X
bf.diagnoseme.fasocivic X X
com.moc.gh X
com.vost.covid19mobile
sg.gov.tech.bluetrace X
com.joinzoe.covid zoe X X X X X
am.gov.covid19 X
sa.gov.nic.tawakkalna X X
fr.gouv.android.stopcovid X X
is.landlaeknir.rakning X X X
jo.gov.moh.aman X X
nz.govt.health.covidtracer X X
es.gob.asistenciacovid19 X X X
com.moi.covid19 X X
au.gov.health.covid19 X
at.roteskreuz.stopcorona X X X
com.proudcrowd.care X X
com.ri.crushcovid X X X X
au.gov.health.covidsafe X X X
ca.bc.gov.health.hlbc.COVID19 X X
de.kreativzirkel.coronika X
com.coronacheck.haugxhaug
.testyourcorona
X
cat.gencat.mobi.StopCovid19Cat X X X
cat.gencat.mobi.confinApp
com.ambulis.aphm.covid X X
fr.aphp.covidom X X
appinventor.ai david taylor
.Coronavirus help2020
uy.gub.salud.plancovid19uy X X X
com.covid19 algeria X X
com.agetic.coronavirusapp X
ch.covid19bs.app.PMSMobile X X
es.gva.coronavirus X
com.govpk.covid19
covid19care.virus.coronavirus
.corona.sick.marcom.health.pakistan
X
com.tommasomauriello
.autocertificazionecoronavirus
X
ca.gc.hcsc.canada.covid19 X
com.krrsoftwaresolutions11.Facemasks
it.adilife.covid19.app X X X
it.adl.aslroma3.covid19.app X X X
com.coronavirus.facemask
com.osapps.covid19
com.maithu.transplantbuddy.covid19 X X X X
ar.gob.coronavirus X X
com.bloomreality.sodi
br.gov.datasus.guardioes X
cz.covid19cz.erouska X X
com.covid19.dgmup X
com.docandu.checker X X
it.softmining.projects.covid19
.savelifestyle
X X
nic.goi.aarogyasetu X X
com.dawsoftware.contacttracker X X X
com.hamagen X X X
hu.gov.virusradar X X
world.coalition.app X X
mk.gov.koronavirus.stop X X
org.sshield.selfshield X X
org.pathcheck.covidsafepaths X X
com.knasirayaz.mohapcovid
gov.georgia.novid20 X X X
nl.lumc.covidradar X
com.Eha.covid 19 X
covid.trace.morocco X X
ru.mos.socmon X X
org.prixa.p5covidtracker X X X X
de.bssd.covid19 X
com.edu.aku.akuhccheck X
com.pixxonai.covid19 X X X X
de.rki.coronadatenspende X
mx.gob.www X
tr.gov.saglik.koronaonlem X X X
com.telkom.tracencare X X
co.gov.ins.guardianes X X X X X
bh.bahrain.corona.tracker X X X X X
bg.government.virusafe X X X X X
Table 3: Second part of Covid-related apps’ characteristics retrieved from
Google Play apps pages
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Package name Upstream Tooling
com.gov.mcmc.projectcatur
com.mohw.corona
kg.cdt.stopcovid19
pl.nask.mobywatel
app.ceylon.selftrackingapp
bf.diagnoseme.fasocivic X X
com.moc.gh
com.vost.covid19mobile
sg.gov.tech.bluetrace
com.joinzoe.covid zoe
am.gov.covid19
sa.gov.nic.tawakkalna X
fr.gouv.android.stopcovid
is.landlaeknir.rakning
jo.gov.moh.aman
nz.govt.health.covidtracer X
es.gob.asistenciacovid19
com.moi.covid19 X
au.gov.health.covid19
at.roteskreuz.stopcorona
com.proudcrowd.care X X
com.ri.crushcovid X
au.gov.health.covidsafe
ca.bc.gov.health.hlbc.COVID19
de.kreativzirkel.coronika X
com.coronacheck.haugxhaug
.testyourcorona
cat.gencat.mobi.StopCovid19Cat
cat.gencat.mobi.confinApp X X
com.ambulis.aphm.covid
fr.aphp.covidom X
appinventor.ai david taylor
.Coronavirus help2020
uy.gub.salud.plancovid19uy X
com.covid19 algeria
com.agetic.coronavirusapp
ch.covid19bs.app.PMSMobile
es.gva.coronavirus X
com.govpk.covid19
covid19care.virus.coronavirus
.corona.sick.marcom.health.pakistan
com.tommasomauriello
.autocertificazionecoronavirus
X
ca.gc.hcsc.canada.covid19
com.krrsoftwaresolutions11.Facemasks X
it.adilife.covid19.app X
it.adl.aslroma3.covid19.app X
com.coronavirus.facemask X
com.osapps.covid19
com.maithu.transplantbuddy.covid19
ar.gob.coronavirus X
com.bloomreality.sodi X
br.gov.datasus.guardioes
cz.covid19cz.erouska X
com.covid19.dgmup X
com.docandu.checker
it.softmining.projects.covid19
.savelifestyle
nic.goi.aarogyasetu
com.dawsoftware.contacttracker
com.hamagen
hu.gov.virusradar
world.coalition.app
mk.gov.koronavirus.stop
org.sshield.selfshield
org.pathcheck.covidsafepaths X
com.knasirayaz.mohapcovid X
gov.georgia.novid20
nl.lumc.covidradar
com.Eha.covid 19 X X
covid.trace.morocco
ru.mos.socmon
org.prixa.p5covidtracker
de.bssd.covid19
com.edu.aku.akuhccheck X X
com.pixxonai.covid19
de.rki.coronadatenspende
mx.gob.www
tr.gov.saglik.koronaonlem X
com.telkom.tracencare X
co.gov.ins.guardianes
bh.bahrain.corona.tracker
bg.government.virusafe
Table 4: Third part of Covid-related apps’ characteristics retrieved from
Google Play apps pages
20 Jordan Samhi et al.
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
201
9-1
1
201
9-1
2
202
0-0
1
202
0-0
2
202
0-0
3
202
0-0
4
202
0-0
5
202
0-0
6
N
um
be
r o
f a
pp
s
Fig. 10: Number of Covid-related apps by appearance date. The month of
June appears hatched to represent the fact that our study was conducted in
early June, which means we do not have all apps released in June.
Providers), computed the size of the dex file, extracted the permissions
needed as well as the libraries used.
Comparison Dataset: For comparing the characteristics of Covid-related
apps with other apps characteristics, we randomly selected 5000 apps from our
initial dataset of 184 563 apps. Those 5000 apps are sampled from the same
time span (i.e., they are coming from the same initial dataset) to ensure that
time is not a factor in potential differences. In the rest of this section, those
5000 apps are referred to standard apps, in opposition to Covid-related apps.
Android Components: Figure 11 depicts differences between standard
apps and our set of Covid-related apps regarding the number of components
included in the app. We notice that Covid-related apps tend to use fewer activ-
ities than standard apps and that their distributions are different. However, it
is unclear whether or not there is a significant difference for the remaining com-
ponents, i.e., services, broadcast receivers and content providers. Therefore, we
apply the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test which is a non-parametric
statistical test for assessing the significance of the difference between two dis-
tributions (Mann and Whitney 1947; Wilcoxon 1945).
We obtained the results available in Table 5. At a 0.05 significance level,
we can see that the distribution of the number of activities in standard and
Covid-related apps are significantly different, likewise for providers. However,
regarding the distribution for services and receivers, the difference does not
seem to be much significant.
Therefore, the difference between those apps seems to appear at the GUI
level since Activities are the main UI building block in Android apps. This
suggests that Covid-related may have less complex GUI than standard apps.
Content Providers are slightly more used in Covid-related apps, which could
hint at Covid-related apps being more data-centric than standard apps.
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Component p-value
Activities 7.9× 10−27
Services 4.5× 10−2
Receivers 5.1× 10−2
Providers 1.6× 10−3
Table 5: p-value revealing the significance of the difference between standard
apps’ and Covid-related apps’ number of components.
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Fig. 11: Number of components: Comparison between standard apps and
Covid-related apps. (STD: standard apps, COVID: Covid-related apps)
Dex files size: Figure 12 shows the distributions of the dex sizes of both
the Covid-related and standard apps. An MWW test confirms the statistical
significance of the difference between both distributions. Figure 12 also shows
that the majority of Covid-related apps are smaller than typical standard apps.
However, the maximum dex size value is higher than standard apps, hinting
at a higher diversity amongst Covid-related apps.
Permissions: In Table 6, we can compare the permissions used by the
set of standard apps and the permissions of the Covid-related apps. For this
purpose, we extracted for both sets of apps the top ten most requested permis-
sions. First, a notable difference is that Covid-related apps tend to use more
the wake lock permission. This permission is used for preventing the screen of
the device from being turned off, and/or to ensure an app remains active. This
feature is likely used for keeping the phone awake while locating the phone. In
the same way, access fine location and access coarse location tend to
be used more by Covid-related apps.
Figure 13 shows the distributions of the number of permissions requested
by standard apps and Covid-related apps. We note that these distributions
are significantly different, as confirmed by a p-value of 10−9 for the MWW
22 Jordan Samhi et al.
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
standard apps Covid-related apps
M
eg
aB
yt
es
Fig. 12: Size of applications: Comparison between standard apps and
Covid-related apps
Permissions
Standard apps % Covid-related apps %
1 INTERNET 98.48% INTERNET 98.86%
2 ACCESS NETWORK STATE 98.34% ACCESS NETWORK STATE 93.18%
3 ACCESS WIFI STATE 89.44% WAKE LOCK 78.40%
4 WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 82.20% RECEIVE 73.86%
5 READ EXTERNAL STORAGE 71.38% ACCESS FINE LOCATION 65.90%
6 WAKE LOCK 68.88% BIND GET INSTALL REFERRER SERVICE 59.10%
7 RECEIVE 56.64% ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 54.64%
8 VIBRATE 53.30% RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED 50.00%
9 ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 51.48% FOREGROUND SERVICE 50.00%
10 ACCESS FINE LOCATION 51.40% WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 38.64%
Table 6: Top ten most requested permissions in both standard apps and Covid-
related apps. Percentage indicates the ratio of apps using the permission.
statistical test. It is notable to see that the median value for Covid-related apps
is half the median of standard apps, which clearly shows that Covid-related
apps request fewer permissions than standard apps. This result suggests that
Covid-related apps leverage fewer functionalities from the Android framework.
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Fig. 13: Number of permissions per app. (STD: standard apps, COVID:
Covid-related apps)
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Libraries: To compare the patterns of libraries inclusion, we measure the
use of libraries by relying on a collection of well-known libraries. More specif-
ically, we re-use two lists of libraries established in prior works (Li et al. 2019;
Li et al. 2016):
a list of 1 114 common libraries and a list of 240 advertisement libraries.
Therefore, for both Covid-related and standard apps datasets, we computed
the number of apps using at least one common library and one advertisement
library.
Table 7 presents our results. First, we notice that almost all the apps
(Covid-related and standard) use common libraries, which is not surprising
since Android software development—just like non-mobile software—heavily
relies on reusable libraries and frameworks.
However, the difference is significant regarding the advertisement libraries.
Indeed, while advertisement libraries are used by more than 80% of stan-
dard apps, they only appear in less than 20% of Covid-related apps. Further-
more, only 3 out of 240 advertisement libraries are used in Covid-related apps,
namely: (1) com.facebook, (2) com.startapp.android and (3) com.flurry. This
strongly suggests that the primary goal of Covid-related apps is not to ob-
tain a financial gain from advertisement, in opposition to the vast majority of
standard apps.
Type of library # COVID # STD
Common Library 92 (100%) 4997 (99.9%)
Advertisement Library 18 (19.6%) 4084 (81.7%)
Table 7: Number of Covid-related/standard apps using libraries
RQ 3 Answer: Covid-related apps are composed of less GUI-related com-
ponents than standard apps, and are usually smaller. While overall they
use fewer permissions, they tend to use more tracking-related permissions.
With respect to libraries, Covid-related apps use common libraries just
like any other apps, but significantly fewer advertisement libraries than
standard apps.
4.4 Are Covid-related Android apps more complex than standard apps?
App complexity is an elusive concept. Yet, in the literature, there are various
studies that propose metrics to measure some form of complexity and attempt
to show its correlation with app quality and maintainability (Josˇt et al. 2013;
Gao et al. 2019b). We undertake to investigate our research question based
on these common metrics from the literature (Chidamber and Kemerer 1994).
We provide in Appendix A the descriptions of the complexity metrics we use.
Since complexity comparison can be biased by the size of apps, we propose
to compare the complexity metrics of Covid-related apps with 5000 randomly
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selected standard apps whose size is within the same size range (0 MB < size <
20 MB).
The different metrics attempt to capture the Lack of Cohesion in Methods
(LCOM), the Weighted number of Methods per Class (WMC), the number of
methods invoked per class, i.e., the Response For a Class (RFC), the Coupling
Between Object classes (CBO) and the Number Of Children per class (NOC).
Figure 14 presents the distributions of metric values. LCOM, WMC, and
CBO appear to present similar distributions across standard and Covid-related
apps. However, MWW test revealed significant differences between the distri-
butions of Covid-related apps and standard apps only for the following metrics:
WMC (p = 0.0012), RFC (p < 10−7), CBO (p < 10−4) and NOC (p < 10−4).
Overall, these results establish that Covid-related apps are, to some extent,
less complex than standard apps. According to (Josˇt et al. 2013), this result
suggests that Covid-related apps may be more maintainable and of better
quality. Additionally, we note that a lower complexity could also indicate that
Covid-related apps have on average less functionalities and/or are focused
on more specific goals, as was already hinted above in the permission usages
comparison.
RQ 4 Answer: Our empirical study shows that Covid-related apps tend
to be less complex than standard apps.
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Fig. 14: Complexity of Covid-related apps compared to standard apps.
4.5 To what extent were Covid-related apps removed from the official Google
Play and why?
We have seen in Section 4.1 that during our analyses, some Covid-related apps
disappeared from the official Google Play in a matter of days. Google has an-
nounced in its policy regarding Covid-related apps (Google 2020) that specific
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checks are performed on Covid-related apps. In this section, we measure the
impact of this policy on the removal of Covid-related apps from Google Play.
Therefore, for each app that was initially identified at the beginning of
our study (i.e., one of the 92 Covid-related apps), we queried the Google Play
market, at the time of writing, to check if the app is still available. Around 15%
of Covid-related apps (i.e., 14 apps) have been removed from Google Play.
In comparison, among 1675 standard apps taken randomly from our initial
dataset (see Section 2), we found that 277 (i.e. 16.54%) apps were removed
from the Google Play market.
The removal rates of both app datasets are close. Actually, we expected a
much higher removal rate for Covid-related apps. This relatively low ratio of
removal for Covid-related apps could be explained in several ways:
– Google either enforces its policy very quickly or pre-screens (i.e., before it
is accepted on the market) each app that is potentially relevant to Covid-
19; In that case, apps would either never make it to the market, or would
be removed too quickly for AndroZoo crawlers to catch them;
– App developers either rapidly adapted to Google’s policy and/or very few
developers proposed apps that conflict with Google’s policy.
RQ 5 Answer: We are not able to reliably answer this research question.
Indeed, even if, based on our study, we could conclude that Covid-related
apps are removed from Google Play at a normal rate, we suspect that
Google removes very quickly Covid-related apps that do not comply with
the Google policy. To reliably conclude on this question, one would need
access to key data about the stream of apps submitted to Google Play
validation process.
4.6 Who are Covid-related apps’ developers?
On Google Play, in each web page of an app11, there is a field developer that
provides the name of the person or entity (e.g. a software company, a govern-
mental institution, an OMG, etc.) who has released the app. After collecting
this information, we detail in Table 2 (column Developer Type) the status (or
the type) of the entity having released an app. Table 8 presents the number
of released Covid-related apps for each type of entities.
We can see that most of the app providers are governmental institutions.
We indeed find Covid-related apps that are officially promoted by national
governments (e.g. Government of Brazil12 or Government of France13). We
also see apps released by more local governmental bodies (at the state or
regional level). We have for instance apps from specific states of the USA
11 https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=PACKAGENAME, where PACKAGE-
NAME is the package name of the app.
12 br.gov.datasus.guardioes
13 fr.gouv.android.stopcovid
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Type of the entity # of apps %
Governmental Institution 52 66.67%
Company 17 21.79%
Association 3 3.85%
Independent 2 2.56%
Researchers 2 2.56%
NGO 1 1.28%
Hospital 1 1.28%
Total 78 100%
Table 8: Number of Covid-related apps per entity type
(e.g., State of Rhode Island14), or from specific ”Switzerland Canton” (e.g.
Gesundheitsdepartement des Kantons Basel-Stadt15).
About 20% of the Covid-related apps (17 apps) are provided by companies.
In order to understand why these apps have not been removed by Google,
we further check the description of these apps and the descriptions of the
companies. We found that:
– Even if the developer is identified as a company, two apps have been de-
veloped on behalf of official bodies (Care19 16 is the official COVID-19 app
for the states of South Dakota and North Dakota, COVID AP-HM 17 is an
app developed for a hospital);
– Seven apps are either endorsed by a ministry18, or working in close col-
laboration with medical/health actors19, or working in collaboration with
renowned universities20.
– Two apps are actually online shopping apps21.
– One app is not on the market anymore22.
– Finally, five apps related to social distancing23, or health24, or Covid-
related news25, have been released by companies without any explicit link
to official organizations. We remind that the official Google Covid-19 pol-
icy (Google 2020) is that Covid-related apps with no explicit links with gov-
ernmental bodies or health organizations cannot provide ”health claims”.
We further check these 5 apps, and we confirm that they comply with the
Google Covid-19 policy.
14 com.ri.crushcovid
15 ch.covid19bs.app.PMSMobile
16 com.proudcrowd.care
17 com.ambulis.aphm.covid
18 covid19care.virus.coronavirus.corona.sick.marcom.health.pakistan
19 com.docandu.checker, it.adl.aslroma3.covid19.app, it.adilife.covid19.app,
com.maithu.transplantbuddy.covid19, de.bssd.covid19
20 com.joinzoe.covid zoe
21 com.coronavirus.facemask and com.krrsoftwaresolutions11.Facemasks
22 com.dawsoftware.contacttracker
23 world.coalition.app and com.bloomreality.sodi
24 de.kreativzirkel.coronika and it.softmining.projects.covid19.savelifestyle
25 com.osapps.covid19
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For the remaining nine Covid-related apps, we noticed that 3 apps have
been provided by associations. More specifically, the DiagnoseMe26 app has
been released by the Faso Civic association from Burkina Faso, the Self Shield
App27 by the Commonwealth Medical Association (through the Common-
wealth Centre for Digital Health organization) and the COVID Safe Paths28
app by a non-profit organization related to MIT. We also noticed that two apps
have been developed by independent developers, and two other apps have been
provided by researchers. One by a group of researchers from German Universi-
ties29, one by researchers from the Aga Khan University in Pakistan30. Finally,
one app has been provided by an NGO (i.e., the Austria Red Cross), and one
by a hospital (actually a group of hospitals in Paris, France).
We note that among all the Covid-related apps, 71% of them have been
released by entities having multiple Android apps on Google Play.
Finally, we represent in the map of Figure 15 the geographical distribution
of the apps over the world. We can see that Covid-related apps are provided
world-wide (maybe less present in Africa). The countries in blue are the ones
listed in Table 2. Note that we also identified 16 other apps from 16 countries
that we were unable to obtain; These countries are represented in red.
Fig. 15: Countries of origin of Covid-related apps (Blue: Apps available, Red:
Apps not available)
26 bf.diagnoseme.fasocivic
27 org.sshield.selfshield
28 org.pathcheck.covidsafepaths
29 com.coronacheck.haugxhaug.testyourcorona
30 com.edu.aku.akuhccheck
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RQ 6 Answer: Most Covid-related apps that are seen on Google Play are
developed with/for official government entities or public health organiza-
tions.
We note that apps developed by non-official entities are not providing
health claims, as per Google’s policy.
Covid-related apps have been released in countries from all continents.
The majority (71%) of Covid-related developers have at least one other
app available on Google Play.
4.7 Are Covid-related apps flagged by privacy & security scanners?
In contrast to a recent work (He et al. 2020), which focused on dissection Covid-
related malware, our aim in this work is not to perform an extensive security
analysis of these apps. Nevertheless, we propose to leverage three practical
security and privacy scanners on our set of 92 Covid-related apps in order to
systematically evaluate three S&P aspects: (1) the presence of privacy leaks;
(2) the number of apps flagged by VirusTotal; (3) the misuse of crypto-APIs.
[Privacy leaks] As we have seen in 4.1, most of the Covid-related apps are
made for collecting personal and sensitive data, e.g., health data and/or the
location of users. Therefore, the security and privacy aspects of these apps are
crucial, and many people started to share concerns related to this topic (Page
2020; Parliament 2020; Stolton 2020). In order to assess the privacy of Covid-
related apps, we applied the state-of-the-art data leak detector FlowDroid-
IccTA (Arzt et al. 2014; Li et al. 2015). Through static analysis, this tool is
able to detect sensitive data leaks intra-component (e.g., inside an Activity)
or inter-component (e.g., across Activities).
FlowDroid-IccTA was able to detect 24 intra-component data leaks in 2
different apps and found no inter-component leak. The app SODI 31 contained
only 1 potential leak, whereas the app Coronavirus - SUS32 contained 23
potential leaks. Given that static analysis tools are subject to false-positives,
we undertake to manually analyze every detected leak.
SODI an app promoting social-distancing. The app is not originating from
a government. Our manual analysis concluded, however, that the reported leak
is a false-positive alarm and does not constitute a real data leak.
Regarding Coronavirus - SUS, which is an official app of the government
of Brazil, FlowDroid-IccTA flagged 24 potential sensitive leaks (i.e., there is
a path between a source (that can access a sensitive data) to a sink (e.g.
sendSMS)). We notice that four of these leaks allow the app to get the lon-
gitude and/or latitude (the sources) of the app to log it internally (the sink).
However, this does not necessarily constitute a malicious behavior.
[AntiVirus detection] For each of the Covid-related apps, we have col-
lected the detection reports from over 60 AntiVirus products, thanks to the
31 com.bloomreality.sodi
32 br.gov.datasus.guardioes
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VirusTotal API33. None of Covid-related apps is flagged by any of the 60
anti-virus software available in VirusTotal at the time of writing.
[Crypto-API misuses] Finally, we leverage the state-of-the-art static-
analyzer CogniCrypt (Krger et al. 2017) through its headless implementation
CryptoAnalysis (CryptoAnalysis 2020) for detecting cryptographic API mis-
uses in Java programs. Such misuses could indeed indicate security issues. We
found that 81 apps among our set of 92 Covid-related apps use JCA34 APIs.
However, CogniCrypt did not report any cryptographic misuse.
In contrast, Gao et al. (2019a) have shown that in a dataset of more than
598 000 apks, 96% of apks using JCA exhibit dangerous misuses of crypto-
graphic APIs. With 0%, Covid-related apps seem to be totally exempt from
such misuses.
RQ 7 Answer: Covid-related apps do not seem to leak sensitive data;
Covid-related apps are not flagged by AntiVirus engines;
Covid-related apps are further free of common cryptography API misuses;
Overall, the analysis results suggest that Covid-related apps do not present
the same security problems as general apps.
5 Threat to validity
Our study bears a number of threats to validity related to the selection of
apps, external factors that may impact our conclusions, and the limitations of
the leveraged tools.
5.1 Covid-related apps retrieval
We may have missed some Covid-related apps. Our approach relies on sim-
ple heuristics to gather applications from AndroZoo, which helped to identify
44 unique apps. Therefore, we cannot guarantee that our app collection of
Covid-related apps is exhaustive. However, we leveraged AndroZoo which is
the largest and continuously-updated repository of Android applications avail-
able to the research community, which we further manually supplemented with
other sources. Overall, it is unlikely that we missed a number of Covid-related
apps that is large enough to significantly invalidate the conclusions presented
in this paper. Actually, as we have revealed, we were able to catch in time
some apps that were later removed from the market.
The enforcement of Google Policy on market apps may have biased our study
on Covid-related apps. Our experiments were conducted until early June 2020,
and we know that Google has been enforcing its policy regarding Covid-related
33 https://www.virustotal.com
34 Java Cryptography Architecture, the most popular library of java Crypto-APIs
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apps since at least early April Google (2020). Given our vantage point with-
out insider knowledge, our observations are limited to apps that were actually
released on Google Play, and our study is blind to apps that were never let in
Google Play. There is thus a possibility that some of our findings are conse-
quences of Google’s policy, and not a characterization of apps that were meant
to be on Google Play. Nonetheless, our study reflects closely the landscape of
apps that were made available to users.
On the other hand, we note that the removal of apps from the market may
have been performed by either market maintainers or by developers them-
selves. Future studies may attempt to investigate closely the reasons of app
removal.
Apk date is unreliable. In our collected dataset, the earliest date of appear-
ance of Covid-related apps goes back to February 2020, but we relied on the
earliest date between the AndroZoo added date, the first submission date to
VirusTotal, and several other websites (included last update date in Google
Play as discussed in Section 4.2). Since AndroZoo does not provide the release
date of an app (which is different from the added date), it could be the case
that the apps existed before. Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the dates of the
files constituting the apps since they can easily be modified (Li et al. 2018).
5.2 Reliability of the app description
As discussed in Hypothesis 4 of Section 3.1, for classifying an app as Covid-
related or not, we manually analyzed the Google Play page of the apps. More
specifically, we relied on the information available on the app description part
of this page. There is a risk that this information could be dishonest, incom-
plete, or misleading. However, we note that no Covid-related app was flagged
by antivirus products, which is an indication that Covid-related apps are un-
likely to be malicious, leaving little incentives for apps publishers to provide
deceptive information. Furthermore, we note that as long as this potential
misinformation is only sporadic, it is very unlikely to significantly alter our
taxonomy. Additionally, the fact that the app descriptions were still available
on Google Play, suggests that Google did not detect any dishonest information.
5.3 Tools limitations
We leveraged several security scanners to evaluate different security character-
istics of apps, and hence inherit their limitations. We cannot guarantee that
these tools yielded accurate analyses. We mitigated the threats by first en-
suring the selection of state of the art tools that are commonly used in the
literature, and second by ensuring that we do not overclaim based on their
results.
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6 Related Work
Several prior works have conducted empirical studies on large sets of Android
applications collected from app markets. Viennot et al. (2014) collected more
than a million apps from Google Play and uncovered several interesting pat-
terns in Android apps and the way they are developed. Also in 2014, Gorla
et al. (2014) collected apps and their associated descriptions and automat-
ically verified whether the descriptions actually matched the app behaviors
while Qu et al. (2014) checked the descriptions against the permission usages.
Other works focused on financial apps (Taylor and Martinovic 2017), on app
maintenance and prices (Carbunar and Potharaju 2015), on malware (Zhou
and Jiang 2012), or on the quality of apps descriptions (Jiang et al. 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, the academic literature has not yet reported
on a systematic study on Covid-related Android apps. He et al. (2020) however
have recently discussed the case of coronavirus-themed malicious apps. In this
paper, the authors analyzed 277 malicious applications related to Covid-19
among an initial dataset of 2016 applications. In our paper, we did not identify
any malicious Covid-related apps which seems to be in contradiction with He
et al. (2020) who collected 277 malicious Covid-related apps. However, this
discrepancy could be explained by at least two reasons:
– We used a more selective filtering process to collect Covid-related apps,
notably because we realized that the keywords we initially used (and that
He et al. (2020) also used) were too broad, i.e., they catch many apps not
related to Covid-19;
– Among their initial dataset of 2016 apps, only 6 are coming from Google
Play. Unfortunately, the paper does not precise whether the 6 apps from
Google Play are part of their 277 identified malicious apps. Overall, their
results show that the vast majority (and probably all, as per our results)
of malicious Covid-related apps are coming from application sources that
are outside Google Play.
Besides, note that in He et al. (2020) we do not have the information
whether they considered different versions of a single app or not. Considering
multiple versions could drastically lower the number of apps in their dataset.
Their study further shows that there is a correlation between the number of
Covid-19 cases in the world and the number of malicious Covid-related apps
and that malicious developers did not repackage existing Covid-related apps
for releasing malicious apps, contrary to a common malware practice (Zhou
and Jiang 2012). He et al. (2020) uncovered 34 different malware families used
in malicious Covid-related apps. Their results further suggest that malware
developers do not target specific users but target a wide range of countries.
Since the emergence of the Covid-19 topic in the media, researchers are
investigating its effect, not only on the medical front but also on our daily
life. Related to the security perspective of mobile applications users, several
security researchers and analysts publicly disclosed their findings, usually in
blog posts or press articles, about the activity of malware developers trying
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to take advantage of the Covid-19 crisis (Doffman 2020; Buguroo 2020; Saleh
2020; Arsene 2020).
Similarly, from a privacy perspective, a common functionality of Covid-
related apps for fighting against the spread of Covid-19 is contact tracing.
Tracing however carries several concerns with respect to user privacy. Indeed,
Baumgrtner et al. (2020) show that although developers claim to respect pri-
vacy, it is possible to de-anonymize information about infected persons that
are traced and even sabotage the tracing effort by injecting fake contacts.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a first systematic study of Covid-related Android
applications. We collected from different channels 92 apps that are manually
vetted as relevant. Then, based on the apps’ described goals, our study yields
a taxonomy of Covid-related Android apps as a contribution to the literature.
Our empirical findings reveal that Covid-related apps have mainly three pur-
poses: (1) inform users, (2) collect data, and (3) provide tooling capabilities
for users. After exploring the inner characteristics (e.g., libraries, permissions,
size) and the results of security and privacy scanners, we provide first insights
into the nature of Covid-related apps. Overall, our empirical study constitutes
a first milestone towards understanding who, what, and how Covid-related
apps are built. We expect future work in the community to go in-depth into
each of the dimensions that we have explored.
All artifacts are made available online at:
https://github.com/JordanSamhi/APKCOVID
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A Description of complexity metrics
Below we present five complexity metrics initially described by Chidamber and Kemerer
(1994).
A.1 Weighted Methods per Class (WMC)
This metric represents the complexity of individual classes by counting the number of meth-
ods per class. Its purpose is to estimate how challenging the development and maintenance
of a class are. Also, as the value for a given class grows, the impact on a class inheriting it
will be greater as they will inherit all the methods.
A.2 Number Of Children (NOC)
This metric represents the number of immediate sub-classes of a class in the class hierarchy. It
measures how many sub-classes will inherit the features (fields, methods, etc.) of the parent
class. The greater the number of children, the greater the reuse of properties, meaning that
it may require more testing.
A.3 Lack of Cohesion in Methods (LCOM)
This metric represents, for each data field in a class, the average percentage of the methods
using that field. It measures the degree of cohesion between methods of a class and data
fields of the given class. The lower the cohesion, the greater the complexity as it increases
the probability of errors during the development process.
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A.4 Coupling Between Object classes (CBO)
This metric represents the dependency that a class has on other classes. It is computed by
counting the number of classes used in a given class. The greater the value, the greater the
complexity since it implies high dependency, hence more testing, and less reusability,
A.5 Response For a Class (RFC)
This metric represents the number of unique method calls within a given class. It is computed
by counting all the method invocations in a class only once. The greater this metric, the
greater the complexity since it implies a greater level of understanding for the tester for
debugging and/or testing purposes.
